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A key aspect of the United Nations’ sustainable development approach centres 
on creating markets for financialized ‘natural capital’ products, particularly in 
resource-rich, lower-income countries. The appeal of this comes from a set of 
policy promises termed the ‘triple-win’: achieving environmental sustainability, 
socially inclusive economic growth and poverty alleviation. Yet, these policies are 
controversial for many reasons, including their potential to foster inequitable 
property regimes, leading to increased potential for conflict. There is a need to 
understand the context and relationships among the green economy, resource 
financialization and emerging areas of conflict within the Southern African region. 
This will be pivotal in achieving sustainable policy reform and coordinated action.
 Understanding Relationships 
 Between the Green Economy, 
 Resource Financialization 
 and Conflict
What is the ‘green economy’?
In recent years, overlapping economic and 
environmental crises have contributed 
to growing support for the coordinated 
establishment of pro-environment 
economic policies and programmes 
around the world. In the lead-up to the 
2012 United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development, or Rio +20, 
the ‘green economy’ emerged as the 
dominant policy approach for achieving 
global transitions toward sustainability. 
Following the framings favoured by the 
United Nations (UN) and partners, the 
green economy refers to a flexible policy 
toolkit that includes recommendations for 
environmental regulations, market-based 
and financial instruments, and voluntary 
initiatives to promote capitalisation of 
environmental goods and services and 
stimulate green economic growth. 
Guiding assumptions of the green economy 
approach include: ( 1 )  environmentally 
sustainable, or ‘green’, economic growth is 
possible within the appropriate accounting, 
market and regulatory contexts; (2) green 
growth can be socially inclusive, pro-poor, 
and can maximise both immediate and local 
benefits to reduce poverty and vulnerability 
and long-term global benefits toward 
sustainability; (3) green economy transitions 
should be universal to realise cumulative 
global shifts toward sustainability; and 
(4) policy tools must be flexible – there 
is no single green growth pathway, and 
strategies will vary by region and country 
based on context, capabilities, preferences 
and resources. 
The broad appeals of green economy 
approaches to environmental preservation 
and development lie in a package of policy 
promises around capturing ‘triple-win’ 
opportunities for achieving socially inclusive 
environmental sustainability, economic 
growth and poverty alleviation. For the 
international community, these reforms 
promise to make the global economy 
and the global environment ‘work’ to 
support one another, while providing 
offsetting mechanisms to mitigate 
environmentally destructive activities. 
For lower-income countries with large 
endowments of natural resources, these 
schemes promise new means of financing 
national development programmes and 
preserving natural ecosystems, which 
have become increasingly framed in policy 






















local level, these policies promise to lead to new 
programmes that will preserve natural resources, 
enhance livelihoods, increase resilience in the face 
of environmental hazards, and generate streams 
of income for cash-strapped local communities. 
The logic and mechanisms of resource 
financialization 
The logic underlying natural resource 
financialization is that economic growth 
and environmental preservation are only 
compatible when nature and its functions 
are priced and marketed correctly. Nature 
financialization involves a few related processes. 
First, it requires the creation of commodities, 
or marketable goods, by applying monetary 
valuation techniques to natural ecosystems 
and environmental processes. Second, it 
requires institutional changes that introduce 
commercial principles (e.g. efficiency), methods 
(e.g. accounting; cost-benefit assessment) 
and objectives (e.g. profit maximisation) into 
environmental governance and resource 
management practices. Third, the monetary 
value that is attached to ecosystems is used as 
the basis for creating tradable instruments, such 
as carbon credits, which are then marketed as 
environmental credits and offsets. 
A variety of natural properties and functions 
are the subject of established or proposed 
financialization initiatives. These include coastal 
protection services; terrestrial and marine 
biodiversity; marine and freshwater purification 
services; terrestrial, marine, and coastal 
carbon storage and generalised or unspecified 
environmental and ecosystem services. Since 
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, compliance 
markets for certified carbon offsets – financial 
instruments that are linked to treaty 
requirements for capping or reducing greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions that, when traded across 
international borders, allow continued emission 
of GHGs in industrial contexts in exchange for 
climate mitigation activities elsewhere – have 
been particularly integral to international 
strategies for climate change mitigation, and 
are one of the most vigorously promoted areas 
of the green economy. In addition, a number of 
voluntary markets for financialized environmental 
products and services have arisen under diverse 
private trading and certification schemes. 
Voluntary markets are not linked to laws or 
international agreements, but are markets on 
which governments, companies and individuals 
can purchase offsets for mitigation. 
Three primary groups of stakeholders have key 
roles and responsibilities related to bringing 
about green economy transitions. Members of 
the UN system and multilateral development 
banks are expected to provide technical advice 
and support to governments in the areas of 
policy and project design. The private sector 
plays the role of investor and innovator. The 
public sector carries the greatest burden 
in these transitions and is responsible for 
influencing the flow of private funds; triggering 
policy and investment transitions; ensuring 
ministerial collaboration and mainstreaming 
of environmental issues, and designing and 
implementing new fiscal and tax policies.
In national contexts, resource financialization 
requires cooperation among donors, 
international banking and finance, environmental 
organisations, formal governance institutions, 
national governments and civil society. 
Policy reforms frequently build upon existing 
regional-level planning structures, national-level 
environmental programmes (NEPs) and protected 
area (PA) networks, and establish linkages to 
international programmes and mechanisms, such 
as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and programmes that help countries develop 
national strategies for Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD/REDD+). 
Establishing linkages to these programmes is 
appealing to the governments of many lower- 
and middle-income countries. This is because 
these programmes are designed to attract 
external investment in green infrastructure 
development, and incorporate schemes for 
payments for ecosystem services (PES) to local 
communities with the goal of compensating for 
the local costs of environmental preservation 
and contributing to poverty alleviation. 
Resource financialization and conflict in 
SADC countries
Research on natural resource conflicts 
demonstrates the significance of so-called 
‘high-value’ natural resources to sustainable 
development planning, conflict, and security 
issues. While this category of resources 
conventionally includes mostly extractive 
products like gold, oil, natural gas and diamonds, 
for example, it can be argued that resource 
financialization is creating a new class of 
non-extractive high-value natural resources. 
These are the monetised natural capital assets 
on which environmental derivatives are based. 
Since the resources in question cannot be 
extracted and traded in informal markets, 
conflicts that arise around natural resource 
financialization are likely to be focused 
around particular localities. They may result 
from clashes over basic understandings of 
environmental phenomena, policy objectives or 
implementation practices. Such conflicts may 
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result in violence, but may also result in tensions, 
ideological insurgencies, new social movements, 
and antagonism and resistance. 
These conflicts may occur in the international 
political forum, or among member countries of 
the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). The mismatch between actual reform 
and the practical realities and constraints to 
planning within the public sector is one reason that 
conflict happens. However, there are countless 
other contributory factors including challenges 
and barriers to environmental mainstreaming, 
long-term regional political and economic 
dominance by South Africa, persistent poverty, 
HIV/AIDS, gender inequity, bureaucratic gridlock, 
poor capacity within government ministries, 
and failed attempts to create employment, 
entrepreneurship and trade opportunities. 
Furthermore, governments of SADC member 
states and their partners have interpreted and 
translated international and regional-level policies 
and recommendations into national planning in 
different ways, which can result in contradictory 
or contested policy objectives on international, 
regional, national and sub-national levels.
Many financialization projects include poverty 
alleviation and enhanced livelihoods as goals, 
yet in practice they shift the rights of access and 
control of land and resources away from direct 
users. Control of territory and resources can 
be shifted to select local elites, state agencies, 
non-governmental organisations and/or private 
investors. Yet again, this can result in conflict 
among practitioners, officials and communities. 
Furthermore, because natural resources 
frequently cross national borders, the politics of 
cross-border resource management can be a 
source of conflict, particularly in regions with high 
levels of economic inequality and dependency 
relationships between countries.
Conflicts can escalate quickly in situations of 
highly uneven political and economic power, or 
in which members of one or more groups are 
perceived to unfairly exert their interests over those 
of others. Because of the distribution of roles and 
responsibilities across stakeholder groups discussed 
above, the bureaucratic complexity of resource 
financialization, and the high stakes of these policy 
reforms for donors, governments, investors, and local 
actors, when conflicts do emerge, they can cross 
scales and be catalysed at multiple jurisdictional levels. 
On a basic level, programming for financialization 
often occurs without guidance on means of 
assessing the potential for conflicts, trade-offs, and 
synergies to arise as projects are implemented. This 
can undermine efforts to achieve goals of inclusivity, 
enhanced livelihoods, poverty alleviation and, 
ultimately, environmental sustainability.
The ‘policy paradox’ of 
community-based forest 
management 
In recent decades, Tanzania has built an international 
reputation as a leader in decentralised community-based 
forest management (CBFM), and the Suledo Forest 
Reserve is an internationally renowned success story in 
community-based management. However, emerging 
REDD+ policies are at odds with CBFM because there is 
a stark difference between the idea of managing a forest 
to maintain it as ‘standing carbon’, and managing a forest 
for multiple and flexible purposes based on the needs and 
priorities of local communities in negotiation with other 
stakeholders along the lines of CBFM. This ‘policy paradox’ 
contributes to the revitalisation of centralised top-down 
approaches to forest management in Tanzania, and, for 
the residents and managers of the Suledo Forest Reserve, 
increasing conflict with administrators over governance, 
rights, and benefits of forest management.
Challenges of offsetting schemes 
In south-eastern Madagascar, Rio Tinto/QIT Madagascar 
Minerals (QMM), a mining company co-owned by 
the government of Madagascar and a multinational 
mining corporation, has sought to offset environmental 
damage caused by extensive mining activities through 
establishing private restrictive PAs dedicated to biodiversity 
offsetting. In this setting, the state, private sector actors, 
non-governmental organisations and displaced and 
under-compensated local communities have come into 
repeated and sometimes violent conflict as a result of the 
inequitable arrangements of the offsetting scheme.
Working across boundaries 
The Maloti-Drakenberg Transfrontier Conservation Area 
is a collaborative boundary PA operated jointly between 
South Africa and Lesotho oriented around biodiversity 
conservation and PES around water resources. 
Despite portrayals of their collaboration over the PA 
as promoting peace and international cooperation, the 
uneven partnership between the planning committees 
of South Africa and Lesotho has resulted in conflict and 
gridlock. Planning conflicts have contributed to tensions 
in local communities as the South African committee 
has sought to dominate priority-setting to, what many 
perceive, the disadvantage of both Lesotho’s planners and 
local stakeholders.
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Policy recommendations
• Priorities should focus on short and long-term benefits and the risks 
of policy reform. Because of the lack of evidence-based studies that 
objectively document the feasibility of ‘triple-win’ outcomes in the context of 
financialization-oriented reforms, efforts should be placed in understanding the 
context for proposed reforms and identifying specific risks, costs and benefits to 
different stakeholders before implementing policies. 
• Social and institutional research should be conducted to assess and identify 
potential areas of conflict among stakeholder groups. In the context of 
specific regional, national or sub-national green economy reform processes 
involving financialization, research should be used to identify risk of conflicts 
arising and to inform protocols for avoiding or mediating conflict situations. 
• Donors and relevant UN agencies should develop clear guidance. Global 
organisations and donors should create ways to assess unanticipated conflicts, 
trade-offs, and synergies that arise on different jurisdictional levels in the 
context of policy reform.
• Project managers should demonstrate evidence of inclusive planning 
activities and adhere to transparent, detailed, and timely reporting 
procedures. This is to ensure better understanding and awareness of conflict 
dynamics in the context of policy implementation. As it stands on a project 
level, policy implementation, evaluation and reporting lacks consistency and 
transparency. 
• In the case of REDD+ and other national-scale programmes, equity 
mechanisms must be established. Establishing mechanisms that link local 
projects to national programmes should be used to ensure that members of 
communities who maintain carbon forests and other resources have a say in 
policy decisions that affect them and receive the financial benefits of their 
conservation activities. 
• Planners introducing reforms both through national programmes and 
through local projects should assume that circumstances shaped by highly 
uneven political and economic power can create conflict, including violent 
conflict. Therefore, reforms that increase inequalities, such as those that 
involuntarily resettle people, restrict people’s livelihoods or take decision-
making about access and control over resources away from direct users, must 
be viewed as unacceptable. 
